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Abstract
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual in-
completeness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable
quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valu-
ation. A simple exit option contract, which allows the buyer to refuse trade, achieves
the first–best in the benchmark cases where either quality is verifiable or the buyer’s
valuation is public information. But, when unverifiable and asymmetric information
are combined, exit options induce inefficient pooling and lead to a particularly simple
contract. Inefficient pooling is unavoidable also under the most general form of con-
tracts, which make trade conditional on the exchange of messages between the parties.
Indeed, simple exit option contracts are optimal if random mechanisms are ruled out.
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts, Asymmetric Information, Exit Options
JEL Classification No.: D82, D86, L15
∗We wish to thank Oliver Gu¨rtler, Paul Heidhues, Timofiy Mylovanov, and Klaus Schmidt for their com-
ments. Support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
†Free University Berlin, Dept. of Economics, Boltzmannstr. 20, D-14195 Berlin (Germany); email:
hbester@wiwiss.fu-berlin.de
‡University of Bonn, Hausdorff Center for Mathematics and Institute for Theoretical Economis, Adenauer
Allee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn (Germany); email: kraehmer@hcm-uni.bonn.de
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in environments with two potential contracting
imperfections: one party has to take a decision which is publicly not verifiable, and the other
party receives decision relevant private information. The environment is thus characterized
by contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. The parties’ contracting problem
is to provide incentives both for the informed party to reveal its private information and for
the other party not to abuse its discretion that arises due to the lack of verifiability.
The existing literature provides core insights on what contracting can achieve if only
one of the two imperfections, either non–verifiability or asymmetric information, prevails.
The literature on implementation under complete information (Maskin (1977), Moore and
Repullo (1988)) has studied the extent to which contracting can overcome problems caused
by non-verifiable information, while the Revelation Principle (Myerson (1979)) represents
the key tool to describe the set of implementable outcomes in the presence of asymmetric
information. Yet little is known about how contracting is affected by the combination of
unverifiable and asymmetric information. This paper presents a step in this direction.
We consider a model with a seller who has to make a non–verifiable quality choice and a
buyer whose valuation for quality is his private information. There is a continuum of buyer
types and the efficient level of quality is a strictly increasing function of the buyer’s type.
Quality is publicly not verifiable (neither ex ante nor ex post), but we assume that it is
observable by the buyer. Consequently, quality cannot be legally enforced and so the seller
has only imperfect commitment.
To focus on the interaction between non–verifiability and asymmetric information, we
consider an environment in which the buyer learns his information only after contracting
has been completed. This implies that first–best efficiency can be attained in either of the
two benchmark cases in which merely one of the imperfections is present. Indeed, in the
benchmark cases, first–best efficiency can be attained by an exit option contract which gives
the buyer the right, after having observed the seller’s quality choice, to refuse or accept to
trade at a pre–specified price.1
1It is well–known from the incomplete contracts literature that contracts with pre–specified default options
can resolve obstacles that arise from non–verifiability. See, e.g., Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey
(1994), No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Evans (2008). Option contracts are
frequently observed in practice. For example, almost all labor contracts give the employee the right to quit.
Also, certain financial contracts such as convertible bond securities can be interpreted as exit option contracts.
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Our first insight is that exit option contracts are no longer efficient when non–verifiability
and asymmetric information are combined. In fact, we demonstrate that exit options can
implement at most a single positive level of quality and can sort buyer types in at most two
groups: low valuation types will not trade the good, and high buyer types will trade the
same quality of the good. Thus, while first–best efficiency calls for a perfect sorting of types,
pooling of buyers is unavoidable under exit option contracts.
Our second insight is that this result qualitatively extends to the most general form of
contracting when the terms of trade can be made conditional on the exchange of messages
between the parties and trade is allowed to be random. Even if there are no restrictions
on the parties’ contracting possibilities, first–best efficiency is not attainable because partial
pooling of types is unavoidable. In light of our benchmark cases, the efficiency loss can be
attributed exclusively to the concurrence of non–verifiability and asymmetric information.
In practice, contracts that prescribe trade to be random are questionable with regard to
their legal enforceability. This raises the issue of what can be achieved by general mechanisms
with deterministic trade. Our third insight is that if random trade is ruled out, then in fact
allowing for more general message games does not generate an efficiency gain over the use of
simple exit option contracts. This result may provide a rationale for why observed contracts
are often simple. Notice that the efficient exit option contract of the benchmark cases is more
complex than the exit option contract in the general environment to the extent that the former
implements a continuum of qualities, each one fine–tuned to the buyer’s valuation, whereas
the latter implements only a single positive quality level. In this sense, as the contracting
environment becomes more complex, the resulting contractual arrangement actually becomes
simpler.
Finally, we characterize the optimal exit option contract. Since only a single quality level
can be implemented under an exit option contract, the optimal contract can be derived from
a straightforward maximization problem, which represents a substantial simplification of the
seller’s original mechanism design problem.
To understand why lack of verifiability and asymmetric information prevent efficiency,
it is useful to understand why efficient exit options can be designed in our two benchmark
cases. If the buyer’s valuation is public information, the efficient exit option leaves the buyer
indifferent between exit and trade at the efficient quality level. This induces the seller to
choose the efficient quality since a downward deviation would trigger the buyer to exit, leaving
the seller without sales. In contrast, when information is private and the seller can commit
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to quality, the standard revelation principle is applicable, and a contract specifies a quality
contingent on (a report about) the buyer’s type. Incentive compatibility then requires that
higher buyer types obtain a higher utility ex post since otherwise they would have incentives
to mimic lower types. This, in turn, implies that higher buyer types must strictly prefer trade
over exit for otherwise low types could achieve the same utility as high types by claiming to
be a high type and then simply exiting.
Therefore, there is a tension between providing first–best incentives jointly for the seller
and the buyer. While limited commitment by the seller requires all buyer types to be in-
different between trade and exit, incentive compatibility requires (almost all) buyer types to
prefer trade over exit. Thus, the constraints that arise from limited commitment and private
information cannot be met jointly by an exit option contract without violating efficiency.
To characterize the set of feasible exit option contracts under asymmetric information,
we allow the buyer to provide information about the realization of his valuation. After
having privately observed his type, the buyer sends a verifiable message to the seller who
then selects a quality level. Since quality is non–verifiable, we cannot appeal to the standard
Revelation Principle and, instead, allow for general, not only direct, communication. Two
forces drive the fact that not more than a single positive quality level can be implemented.
First, refusing to trade has the same value for any buyer type. Second, the seller’s limited
commitment implies that for any positive quality level that is implemented in equilibrium,
there must be some type who is indifferent between refusing and accepting trade at this
quality level. Thus, if two positive quality levels are implemented, the lower of the two
indifferent types could attain the same utility as the higher one by announcing the respective
message and then exit. But this would contradict the incentive compatibility requirement
that lower types get a lower utility than higher types in equilibrium.
A similar force drives the result that first–best efficiency can also not be attained under
the most general form of contracting. Notice that exit options limit the communication
between the parties after the seller has chosen quality to a ‘trade’– or ‘exit’–message by the
buyer. In addition, they restrict the probability of trade to be either one or zero. We therefore
remove these restrictions by considering contracts that condition the possibly random trading
outcome on arbitrary forms of verifiable communication, which takes place after the buyer
has announced an initial message about his private information and the seller’s quality choice
has been observed.
To induce the seller to choose first–best quality, the contract needs to endow the buyer
with a credible “exit threat” that deters the seller not to deviate from the first–best quality.
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Efficiency requires that in equilibrium no buyer makes use of his threat. Moreover, for the
threat to be credible the buyer must be indifferent between what he gets in equilibrium and
what he would get did he enforce the threat. But similarly as in the case of exit option
contracts, it would then become attractive for low buyer types to claim to be of a high type
and then exert the threat.
The key difference between an exit option and the general contract is that when the buyer
were to exert the exit threat under the general contract, trade can still occur with positive
probability. But, low buyer types attach lower value to such a random exit threat than
high buyer types. Thus, letting high types trade with positive probability upon exerting the
exit threat provides a force, imperfect though, to prevent low types from mimicking high
types and then exerting the threat. However, when trade is deterministic, the possibility of
a random exit threat is removed and we are back in the exit option case. Therefore, general
contracts do not improve upon simple exit option contracts when only deterministic trade is
contractible.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature by combining implementation under complete and
incomplete information, which the existing literature largely treats as separate domains. The
basic idea of implementation under complete information is that the information that the
parties commonly observe can be reflected in verifiable messages to a third party.2 A contract
may therefore specify an outcome as a function of such messages and thus provide appropriate
incentives for parties to select non–verifiable actions ex ante. Indeed, the efficient exit option
mechanism of our first benchmark case in which the buyer’s valuation is public information
is an example of a sequential mechanism in the spirit of subgame perfect implementation
(cf. Che and Hausch (1999), Proposition 1). However, in an environment in which there
is not only non–verifiable but also asymmetric information at the communication stage, we
cannot apply implementation results that rely on complete information. Instead, we study
which trading outcomes can be implemented as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium after the seller
has chosen quality. In the spirit of Maskin (1977), we require strong implementation and
demonstrate that the combination of private and unverifiable information severely restricts
the range of implementable outcomes. Importantly, since we assume contracting to take place
under symmetric information, the first–best can be achieved in our other benchmark case in
which quality is verifiable. Therefore, our inefficiency result does not originate simply in the
2See the seminal papers by Maskin (1977) and Moore and Repullo (1988). For a survey, see Moore (1992).
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buyer’s power to extract information rents. It is the lack of verifiability in combination with
asymmetric information that generates inefficiencies.
Reversely, the predominant focus of the literature on implementation under incomplete
information has been how to elicit private information when contracts are complete. The
standard Revelation Principle (see e.g. Myerson (1979)) states that the range of imple-
mentable outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes that can be achieved through direct
and truthful communication. Yet since our model displays contractual incompleteness, we
cannot rely on this principle because it requires the contracting parties to write a complete
contract in the sense that all message–dependent variables are specified as part of the mech-
anism.3 As Bester and Strausz (2001, 2007) show, if this requirement is not satisfied, the
optimal mechanism may use some form of noisy communication with only partial information
revelation. Indeed, for our analysis of optimal exit options we can apply the framework of
Bester and Strausz (2001), except for the technical problem that we do not consider a finite
type space. In our context, noisy communication actually simplifies the optimal contract
because it pools the continuum of buyer types into merely two groups: all types below a
critical type do not trade, and all other types purchase the same quality.
Finally, our work is related to the large literature on the hold–up problem. The key
difference is that in line with much of the literature on implementation, we assume that the
parties can commit not to renegotiate ex post inefficient outcomes.4 In contrast, the hold–up
literature has studied what contracts can achieve in the absence of this commitment. Our
setup can be seen as a hold–up problem where the seller’s quality choice corresponds to a
‘purely cooperative’ ex ante investment that enhances the buyer’s valuation, and the buyer
does not invest. In the context of an exit option contract, our commitment assumption means
that the parties can commit not to renegotiate the pre-specified terms of trade if the buyer
exerts the exit option while gains from trade would exist.
While some authors argue that contract renegotiation leads to inefficient investments by
substantially or even fully undermining the power of contracting (Hart and Moore (1988),
Che and Hausch (1999), Edlin and Hermalin (2007)), others have identified contractual de-
vices that induce first–best investments (Chung (1991), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994),
No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), Evans (2006, 2008)). Our paper
is complementary to this debate. It provides an inefficiency result which is not rooted in the
3In our model, this would require that the seller’s quality choice is contractually determined as a function
of the buyer’s report about his valuation.
4For implementation and renegotiation under complete information see Maskin and Moore (1999).
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parties’ lack of commitment to enforce ex post inefficient default outcomes. Since the inef-
ficiencies associated with unverifiable investments are important for providing explanations
for different economic institutions (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)),
our analysis suggests that enriching the incomplete contracts paradigm by the consideration
of asymmetric information may be a fruitful direction for the analysis of organizations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the contracting environment. In
Section 3 we consider exit option contracts in the benchmark cases, where either quality is
verifiable or the buyer’s valuation is public information. Section 4 studies the optimal exit
option contract with private and unverifiable information. Section 5 extends the analysis by
considering messages games. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. The proofs of all formal
results are relegated to an appendix in Section 7.
2 The Model
We consider a buyer and a seller, who are both risk neutral. In the first stage t = 0 they can
write a contract about the terms of trade, which occurs in some future stage t = 3. After
a contract has been signed, the realization of a random variable θ determines the buyer’s
type in stage t = 1. In stage t = 2 the seller selects the quality q ≥ 0 of an indivisible good.
The buyer’s valuation of consuming quality q depends on his type θ and is given by v(q, θ).
The seller’s cost of producing quality q is c(q). In stage t = 3 the buyer observes the seller’s
quality choice. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
-
t = 0
Contract
is signed
t = 1
Buyer observes
realization of θ t = 2
Seller selects
quality q
t = 3
Buyer observes
quality q
Figure 1: The Sequence of Events
In the first step of the analysis we study what the parties can achieve by using exit option
contracts. In Section 5 we extend the analysis to more general contracts. An exit option
contract allows the buyer in stage t = 3 to decide whether to accept delivery or to reject and
exit. We assume that the buyer’s decision is publicly observable. Thus at t = 0 it is possible
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to write a contract that specifies the buyer’s payment p = (pT , pN) contingent on whether
trade takes place or not.5 Note that we do not rule out payments from the seller to the buyer
because pT and pN are not restricted to be non–negative. Also note that the buyer’s exit
option in stage t = 3 is endogenously determined by the contract. A contract can eliminate
this option simply by specifying a sufficiently large payment pN .
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The buyer’s (gross) outside option value is zero, independently of his type θ. Therefore,
type θ accepts trade as long as v(q, θ)− pT ≥ −pN . We denote the buyer’s decision behavior
in the final stage by
h(q, p | θ) =
{
1 if v(q, θ)− pT ≥ −pN ,
0 if v(q, θ)− pT < −pN .
(1)
Thus, the buyer type θ’s payoff depends on q and p according to
U(q, p | θ) = h(q, p | θ)[v(q, θ)− pT ]− (1− h(q, p | θ))pN (2)
= max[v(q, θ)− pT ,−pN ],
The seller’s profit is
Π(q, p | θ) = h(q, p | θ)pT + (1− h(q, p | θ))pN − c(q) (3)
when he faces a buyer of type θ.
The buyer’s type θ is drawn from the interval Θ = [θ, θ¯] ⊂ R according to the continuously
differentiable cumulative distribution function F (·) with F ′(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Let T denote
the Borel σ–algebra on Θ. We make the following assumptions about v(·) and c(·):7
v(0, θ) = 0, vq(q, θ) > 0, vθ(q, θ) > 0, vqq(q, θ) ≤ 0, vqθ(q, θ) > 0, (4)
c(0) = 0, c′(q) > 0, c′′(q) > 0. (5)
Finally, to avoid corner solutions, we assume that vq(0, θ) > c
′(0) and vq(q¯, θ) < c
′(q¯) for q¯
sufficiently large.
5In principle, a contract could also require the buyer to make some down–payment p0 in stage t = 0. But,
it is easy to see that this would be equivalent to setting p′
T
= pT + p0 and p
′
N
= pN + p0.
6In contrast, Compte and Jehiel (2007) define quitting rights by requiring that transfers are zero in the
disagreement case.
7Subscripts are used to denote partial derivatives.
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Our assumptions ensure that for any realization of θ ∈ Θ the first–best quality, which
maximizes the joint surplus,
q˜(θ) ≡ argmaxq≥0 v(q, θ)− c(q) (6)
is positive and unique. Also, by the last condition in (4), q˜(·) is strictly increasing in θ. If,
in addition to the transfers p, the buyer and the seller were able to contractually specify the
quality-level q˜(θ) contingent upon the realization of θ, this would maximize their ex ante
expected total surplus in stage t = 0.
In what follows, however, we consider two limitations on the parties’ contracting possi-
bilities that prevent them from making q˜(θ) part of the contract. First, we assume that,
although quality q is perfectly observable by both parties, it is not verifiable to outsiders.
Thus a contract that explicitly specifies some q cannot be enforced by the courts. The buyer
and the seller can only write an incomplete contract that leaves the selection of q at the
seller’s discretion.
Second, we assume that the buyer is privately informed about his type θ. This problem
of asymmetric information makes it impossible to condition the variables of the contract
directly upon the buyer’s observation of θ. But, a contract may specify a set M of verifiable
messages and require the buyer to select a message m ∈M after observing his type. An exit
option contract (M, p) thus consists of a message set M and message contingent transfers
p:M → R2 such that, when in stage t = 1 the buyer reports m ∈M, he has to pay pT (m) in
stage t = 3 if accepting trade and pN(m) otherwise. Upon receiving the message m, the seller
updates his beliefs about the buyer’s type and chooses some quality q(m) in stage t = 2.
The objective of our analysis is to characterize the contract that maximizes the seller’s
expected profit in t = 0 subject to the buyer’s participation constraint and the restrictions
imposed by contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. But we relegate the
derivation of the optimal exit option contract to Section 4. In the following section, we first
consider two benchmark environments where either the quality q is contractible or the buyer’s
type θ is publicly observable.
3 Two Benchmarks
To disentangle the implications of contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information,
we consider two reference points in this section. We first derive the seller’s optimal con-
tract when quality is verifiable and contractible, but the buyer’s type is private information.
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We then analyse the case where the buyer’s type is publicly observable, but quality is not
verifiable. It will turn out that in either situation the seller can appropriate the first–best
surplus
S˜ ≡
∫ θ¯
θ
[v(q˜(θ), θ)− c(q˜(θ))] dF (7)
under a contract that induces the buyer of type θ to accept quality q˜(θ). This means that
there is no efficiency loss as long as at least one of the variables q and θ is publicly observable.
Contractible q, asymmetric information about θ
Suppose quality q is verifiable so that the seller can contractually commit to q(m) after
receiving the buyer’s message m ∈ M. In this situation, the Revelation Principle (see e.g.
Myerson (1979)) allows restricting the analysis to direct and truthful communication. There-
fore, without loss of generality, the seller can use a contract with M = Θ, q: Θ → R+ and
p: Θ→ R2. Further, the contract has to be incentive–compatible so that reporting truthfully
is optimal for each type θ of the buyer.
The seller’s problem is thus to maximize his expected profit subject to the incentive–
compatibility conditions and the buyer’s participation constraint:
max{q(·), p(·)}
∫ θ¯
θ
Π(q(θ), p(θ) | θ)dF (8)
subject to
U(q(θ), p(θ) | θ) ≥ U(q(θ′), p(θ′) | θ) for all (θ, θ′), (9)
∫ θ¯
θ
U(q(θ), p(θ) | θ)dF ≥ 0. (10)
The incentive compatibility constraints (9) ensure that no buyer has an incentive to
misrepresent his type. Note that our incentive compatibility constraints are somewhat non–
standard, compared e.g. to a standard price discrimination problem, because they also
comprise that no buyer has an incentive to misreport his type and subsequently refuse to
trade. The participation constraint (10) guarantees that the buyer’s expected utility at the
contracting stage, before he learns his type, is at least zero. The next proposition states that
the first–best can be implemented.
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Proposition 1 (a) There exists a p∗(·) such that {q˜(·), p∗(·)} solves problem (8) – (10).
Moreover, h(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ and∫ θ¯
θ
Π(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ)dF = S˜.
(b) For any solution {q∗(·), p∗(·)} of problem (8) – (10) it holds for almost all θ ∈ Θ that
v(q∗(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) > −p
∗
N(θ).
The idea behind part (a) is to specify a large exit payment so that no buyer type wants
to submit a report that leads to exit. This effectively eliminates the exit option and we are
back in a standard price discrimination framework for which it is well known that the seller
can fully extract the first–best surplus if the buyer learns his private information only ex
post.
Part (b) is an implication of incentive compatibility for the buyer’s trade incentives that
any optimal contract has to satisfy. In light of (a), any optimal contract must extract all gains
from trade and thus induce almost all buyer types to trade. Now if two buyer types trade, a
straightforward implication of incentive compatibility is that the high valuation buyer must
obtain a larger ex post utility v−pT than the low valuation buyer. It follows that almost any
buyer type (except possibly the lowest) must strictly prefer trade over exit after reporting
his type truthfully. Otherwise, if one buyer type θ was exactly indifferent, all smaller types
θ′ < θ would be better off by pretending to be type θ in t = 1 and exiting in t = 3.
Non–contractible q, public information about θ
Suppose now that the buyer’s type θ is public information and that quality q, though observ-
able by both parties, is not contractible. In this situation, messages from the buyer about his
type are redundant, and the seller can simply offer a contract p : Θ → R2 where the trade
and exit transfers are p(θ), when the buyer’s type is θ. Since q is not contractible, the seller
will select q ex post so as to maximize his profits given the transfers p(θ). In other words,
the choice of q is constrained by imperfect commitment on part of the seller.
The seller’s problem is thus to maximize his expected profit subject to his no–commitment
constraint and the buyer’s participation constraint:
max{q(·), p(·)}
∫ θ¯
θ
Π(q(θ), p(θ) | θ)dF (11)
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subject to
Π(q(θ), p(θ) | θ) ≥ Π(q′, p(θ) | θ) for all q′, θ, (12)
∫ θ¯
θ
U(q(θ), p(θ) | θ)dF ≥ 0. (13)
The no–commitment constraint (12) describes the seller’s choice of quality in t = 2. He
selects q to maximize his profit ex post, given the transfers p and the buyer’s type θ. Thus,
when designing the contract, the seller has to take into account his ex post incentives for
selecting q. Even though quality cannot be contractually determined, the next proposition
demonstrates that by the appropriate choice of exit options the seller can commit himself to
choose the first–best quality q˜ ex post.
Proposition 2 (a) There exists a p∗(·) such that {q˜(·), p∗(·)} solves problem (11) – (13).
Moreover, h(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ and
∫ θ¯
θ
Π(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ)dF = S˜.
(b) For any solution {q∗(·), p∗(·)} of problem (8) – (10) it holds for almost all θ ∈ Θ that
v(q∗(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) = −p
∗
N(θ).
The basic idea behind part (a) is to contract an exit payment of zero and to specify the
trade transfer in such a way that each buyer type is exactly indifferent between trade and
exit when the seller offers the first–best quality. This contract commits the seller not to shirk
ex post because otherwise the buyer would exit and leave the seller with a zero payment.
Part (b) illuminates the implications of the no–commitment constraint for the buyer’s trade
incentives. Under any optimal contract the buyer needs to be indifferent between exit and
trade when offered the first–best quality. Otherwise, incentives would arise for the seller to
shade quality below the first–best.
Proposition 2 (a) is closely related to an observation by Che and Hausch (1999) who
show that the first–best can be implemented when the parties can commit themselves not to
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renegotiate the contract. They continue their analysis by establishing an inefficiency result
if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible. In contrast, we maintain the
assumption that contracts are not renegotiated. In the next section, we provide a different
inefficiency result for the case where the buyer’s type is private information. In this sense,
our analysis is complementary to Che and Hausch (1999).
Our inefficiency result is inspired by the observation that part (b) of Propositions 1 and 2
are clearly incompatible: when the buyer’s type is private information, each buyer type must
strictly prefer trade over exit in order to prevent lower types from untruthfully reporting a
high valuation and exiting subsequently. In contrast, when quality is non–contractible, each
buyer type needs to be indifferent between trade and exit in order to prevent the seller from
abusing his ex post discretion. Thus, there is a tension in providing appropriate incentives
jointly for the buyer (incentive compatibility) and the seller (no–commitment). This indicates
that the first–best cannot be implemented when quality is non–contractible and the buyer’s
type is private information.
4 Exit Options
We now turn to characterizing the optimal exit option contract when the seller cannot con-
tractually commit to some quality q and, at the same time, the buyer is privately informed
about his type θ. For this type of problem, it is well–known that it may not be optimal to
use a direct communication mechanism that induces truthful revelation. Indeed, as shown
in Bester and Strausz (2001), an indirect mechanism may support outcomes that cannot be
replicated by a direct mechanism. Bester and Strausz (2001) also show, however, that when
the set of types Θ is finite, any incentive efficient outcome can be replicated by an equilibrium
of a direct mechanism. Unfortunately, their result does not apply to our environment since
the set Θ represents a continuum of types. To overcome this problem, we first characterize
the outcomes that can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under some arbitrary
message set M.8 This allows us in a second step to derive the seller’s optimal exit option
contract.
8In a different context also Krishna and Morgan (2004) consider a contracting problem with imperfect
commitment and a continuum of types.
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Let the message set M be an arbitrary metric space and let M denote the Borel σ−algebra
onM. The contract between the seller and the buyer specifies the transfers p:M → R2. Thus,
when the buyer reports m ∈ M, he has to pay pT (m) if accepting trade, and pN(m) if he
exits in the final stage. The functions pN(·) and pT (·) are taken to be measurable.
We denote the θ–type buyer’s reporting strategy by r(·|θ) ∈ Q, where Q is the set of
probability measures on M. Thus, if r(H | θ) > 0 for some H ∈ M, this means the message
chosen by the θ–type buyer lies in H with probability r(H | θ).
After receiving message m, the seller updates his beliefs about the buyer’s type. We
denote these beliefs as µ(T,m). Thus, upon observing message m, the seller believes that the
buyer’s true type is in the set T ∈ T with probability µ(T,m). Given his beliefs, the seller
chooses q(m) to maximize his expected payoff.
To constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the functions (r, µ, q) have to satisfy three
conditions: First, the seller’s choice of q has to be optimal given his beliefs. This means that
q(·) has to satisfy the no–commitment constraint
q(m) = argmax
q
∫ θ¯
θ
Π(q, p | θ)µ(θ,m)dθ (14)
for all m ∈M.
Second, as the buyer anticipates that message m will induce the seller to select q(m), he
will select an optimal reporting strategy. The set of optimal messages for type θ is
M(θ) ≡ {m ∈M |U(q(m), p(m) | θ) ≥ U(q(m′), p(m′) | θ) for all m′ ∈M}. (15)
Let R(θ) denote the support of the θ-type buyer’s reporting strategy r(·|θ). Then optimality
of the buyer’s reporting strategy requires that
R(θ) ⊆M(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. (16)
We refer to the constraint (16) as the buyer’s communication incentive constraint.
Third, the seller’s belief µ has to be consistent with Bayesian updating on the support of
the buyer’s reporting strategy. This means that µ(·,m) is derived from Bayes’ rule whenever
m ∈ R(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ. Of course, the belief µ determines the seller’s choice of q also
for messages that lie outside the support of the buyer’s reporting strategy. Yet, there are no
consistency restrictions on beliefs for such messages.
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Feasible contracts
Our next aim is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes that can arise under an arbitrary
contract (M, p). We demonstrate that at most a single positive quality level can be imple-
mented in equilibrium. Let us begin by introducing further notation. Consider a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium under some arbitrary message set M . In equilibrium, each buyer type
submits a messagem and will then be offered the quality q(m). We say that trade at a positive
quality takes place if q(m) > 0 and the buyer accepts to trade. We denote byM+(θ) ⊆M(θ)
the set of all messages that are optimal for the θ–type buyer and lead to trade at a positive
quality:
M+(θ) ≡ {m ∈M(θ) | q(m) > 0 and h(q(m), p(m) | θ) = 1}. (17)
We denote by R+(θ) ⊆ R(θ) the set of all messages that are in the support of the θ–type
buyer and lead to trade at a positive quality:
R+(θ) ≡ R(θ) ∩M+(θ). (18)
If m ∈ R+(θ), we refer to m as a positive trade message for buyer type θ. For a given message
m, we collect all types for whom m is a positive trade message in the set T+(m):
T+(m) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |m ∈ R+(θ)}. (19)
Notice that T+(m) = ∅ if and only if there is no buyer type for whom m is a positive trade
message, that is, m is in no buyer type’s support, or q(m) = 0, or each buyer who submits
m exits. Therefore, we refer to m as a positive trade message if T+(m) 6= ∅. For any positive
trade message, we define
θℓ(m) ≡ inf T
+(m). (20)
The next two lemmas state basic consequences of the no–commitment (14) and the com-
munication incentive (16) constraints. Lemma 1 follows from (14).
Lemma 1 Let m be a positive trade message, then the buyer type θℓ(m) is indifferent between
trade and exit, i.e. v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m) = −pN(m) if T
+(m) 6= ∅.
To see the intuition for Lemma 1, note that each type for whom m is a positive trade
message, weakly prefers trade over exit conditional on reporting m. Thus, by continuity, also
the type θℓ(m) weakly prefers trade over exit when offered q(m). The fact that he cannot
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strictly prefer trade over exit is a consequence of the seller’s no–commitment constraint:
when receiving message m, the seller infers that the buyer’s type cannot be smaller than
θℓ(m) because no type smaller than θℓ(m) sends message m in equilibrium. Thus, if the
θℓ(m)–type strictly preferred trade over exit, the seller could slightly reduce the quality and
the buyer would still accept to trade with probability 1.
The next lemma follows from Lemma 1 and the communication incentive constraint.
Lemma 2 The exit payments pN(m) and the types θℓ(m) are the same for all positive trade
messages m, i.e. pN(m) = pN(m
′) and θℓ(m) = θℓ(m
′) if T+(m) 6= ∅ and T+(m′) 6= ∅.
To understand Lemma 2, observe first that continuity of U in θ and the definition of
the infimum imply that any positive trade message m is an optimal message for the buyer
type θℓ(m). Since θℓ(m) is indifferent between exit and trade when he sends message m, his
utility from sending m is simply −pN(m). Hence, if there was some other message m
′ with
pN(m
′) < pN(m), message m could not be optimal, as submitting m
′ and exiting would yield
the buyer a larger utility.
Further, the intuition for why θℓ(m) = θℓ(m
′) is similar to the case in which q is con-
tractible. If two buyer types weakly prefer trade over exit upon sending some message, then
the higher type must obtain a strictly larger utility v − pT in order for him not to have
incentives to deviate to the message of the lower type. Hence, θℓ(m) must be the same as
θℓ(m
′) because by Lemma 1 both types weakly prefer to trade and their utility v − pT is the
same due to Lemma 1 and because pN(m
′) = pN(m).
Lemma 2 allows us to define a critical type and constant exit payments for all positive
trade messages m:9
θˆ ≡ θℓ(m) and pˆN ≡ pN(m) for all m with T
+(m) 6= ∅. (21)
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we deduce:
v(q(m), θˆ)− pT (m) = −pˆN for all m with T
+(m) 6= ∅. (22)
Condition (22) says that only such positive quality levels can be implemented as an equi-
librium for which the critical type is indifferent between trade and exit. In fact, the no–
commitment and communication incentive constraints together imply that only a single
positive quality level can be implemented in equilibrium. This is stated in the following
equilibrium characterization:
9If there is no positive trade message, i.e. if T+(m) = ∅ for all m ∈M , we set θˆ = θ¯.
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Proposition 3 In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, there is a θˆ and a qˆ > 0 such that:
(i) For all θ > θˆ and m ∈ R(θ) it holds that q(m) = qˆ and h(q(m), p(m) | θ) = 1.
(ii) For all θ < θˆ and m ∈ R(θ) it holds that q(m) = 0 or h(q(m), p(m) | θ) = 0.
The proposition says that in equilibrium only an imperfect sorting of types into two groups
can occur and that at most one group can trade at a positive quality level. A finer sorting of
types, say with two positive quality levels, is impossible because communication incentives
would imply that the high quality traders must get a higher utility from trade than the low
quality traders. At the same time, for high quality provision by the seller to be credible, the
lowest high quality trader must be indifferent between trade and exit. But then a low quality
trader can obtain the same utility as this high quality trader by asking for the high quality
and then exiting.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 3 is that the first–best cannot be implemented.
By Propositions 1 and 2, this inefficiency result is driven by the combined presence of private
information and contractual incompleteness.
Optimal Exit Options
We now derive the optimal exit option contract for the seller. Proposition 3 implies that
the optimal contract can be found in the class of contracts that have only two messages, say
ml,mh. Such a contract induces a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which all ‘high’ types
above a critical θˆ report the message mh and trade the positive quality q(mh) = qˆ, and all
‘low’ types below θˆ report message ml and trade a zero quality q(ml) = 0.
The seller’s problem is to choose transfers p = {pN(ml), pT (ml), pN(mh), pT (mh)}, a qual-
ity qˆ, and a critical type θˆ that maximize his ex ante profit subject to the participation
constraint and the constraint that (qˆ, θˆ) can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
given the transfers p. Without loss of generality, we set pN(ml) = pT (ml) = pN(mh) and
define pN = pN(mh), and pT = pT (mh) with pT > pN .
10 Formally, the seller’s problem is:
max
pN ,pT ,qˆ,θˆ
F (θˆ)pN + (1− F (θˆ))(pT − c(qˆ)) (23)
10By Proposition 3, all types who send message ml trade quality 0 and exit. Hence, we need that v(0, θ)−
pT (ml) ≤ −pN (ml), and that the seller optimally set q = 0 if he receives message ml. Any transfers with
pN (ml) = pT (ml) satisfy these two requirements. Further, equating pT (ml) and pN (mh) is a normalization.
Finally, pT > pN because by Proposition 3, we must have: v(qˆ, θˆ)− pT = −pN . Since qˆ > 0, this implies that
pT > pN .
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subject to
qˆ ∈ argmax
q
∫ θ¯
θˆ
Π(q, p | θ)
1− F (θˆ)
dF (θ), (24)
v(qˆ, θˆ) = pT − pN , (25)
−F (θˆ)pN +
∫ θ¯
θˆ
[v(qˆ, θ)− pT ] dF (θ) ≥ 0. (26)
The seller’s objective (23) consists of two parts. The first part is the expected profit that he
extracts from the types who announce message ml and pay the transfer pN . Since the quality
traded is zero, no production costs accrue to the seller in this case. The second part is the
expected profit that the seller extracts from the types who announce message mh and pay
the transfer pT . Since all these types trade quality qˆ, the seller has costs c(qˆ) in this case.
Constraints (24) and (25) require that (qˆ, θˆ) constitutes an equilibrium. By the no–
commitment constraint (24), if the seller receives message mh, he infers that the buyer type
is larger than θˆ, and his belief that he faces a type θ is given by the conditional distribution
dF (θ)/(1− F (θˆ)). Given these beliefs, qˆ has to be the optimal quality selection. Condition
(25) is the equilibrium requirement from Proposition 3 that the critical type θˆ be indifferent
between exit and trade at transfers p and quality level qˆ. Finally, (26) is the buyer’s ex ante
participation constraint.
We proceed by making the seller’s problem more tractable. Observe first that the par-
ticipation constraint must obviously be binding at the optimum. Combining this with the
seller’s objective, the seller’s problem becomes to maximize the total surplus
S(qˆ, θˆ) =
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(v(qˆ, θ)− c(qˆ)) dF (θ) (27)
subject to (24) and (25).
Next, we reformulate the constraints (24) and (25). As explained above, these constraints
embody the two requirements that the seller’s choice be optimal given his beliefs, and that
the seller’s beliefs be consistent with the buyer’s reporting strategy. To describe equilibrium,
we first consider the seller’s optimal quality choice (his ‘best response’) against arbitrary
beliefs. Suppose the seller has received message mh and holds the belief that all types larger
than an arbitrary type θˆ have submitted mh. Then choosing a relatively high quality q with
v(q, θˆ) − pT > −pN is clearly suboptimal for him, because all types θ ≥ θˆ have a strict
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incentive to trade and so the seller could gain by slightly lowering quality. Therefore, the
seller must optimally choose a quality level q′ such that v(q′, θˆ)− pT ≤ −pN . By setting such
a quality q′, the seller effectively chooses a type θ′ ∈ [θˆ, θ¯] who is indifferent between trade
and exit because v(q′, θ′) = pT − pN . All types θ ≥ θ
′ accept quality q′, whereas all types
θ ∈ [θˆ, θ′] exit. Thus, the seller anticipates that quality q′ will be rejected with probability
(F (θ′)− F (θˆ))/(1− F (θˆ)) and accepted with probability (1− F (θ′))/(1− F (θˆ)).
Thus, given transfers p and given the belief that all types larger than type θˆ have sub-
mitted mh, the seller’s optimal behavior is defined by the pair
(q∗(θˆ, p), θ∗(θˆ, p)) ≡ argmax
q′,θ′
F (θ′)− F (θˆ)
1− F (θˆ)
pN +
1− F (θ′)
1− F (θˆ)
pT − c(q
′) (28)
subject to v(q′, θ′) = pT − pN and θ
′ ≥ θˆ. (29)
While (28) describes the seller’s best response against arbitrary beliefs, in equilibrium the
seller’s beliefs are consistent with the buyer’s actual behavior. This is made explicit in the
next lemma which provides an alternative characterization of the equilibrium conditions (24)
and (25).
Lemma 3 Let p be given. Then (qˆ, θˆ) satisfies (24) and (25) if and only if (qˆ, θˆ) solves the
following fixed–point problem:
qˆ = q∗(θˆ, p) and θˆ = θ∗(θˆ, p). (30)
Since the conditions (30) include the optimality conditions for the seller, (qˆ, θˆ) has to satisfy
the necessary first–order conditions for optimality of problem (28). We now impose conditions
on F and v such that the first–order conditions are actually sufficient for optimality. This
allows us to state Lemma 3 in terms of first–order conditions.
Lemma 4 Let F (·) be convex and v(·) be quasi–concave.11 For given p, (qˆ, θˆ) then solves the
fixed–point problem (30) if and only if
−
F ′(θˆ)
1− F (θˆ)
(pT − pN) + c
′(qˆ)
vθ(qˆ, θˆ)
vq(qˆ, θˆ)
≤ 0, (31)
v(qˆ, θˆ) = pT − pN . (32)
11A sufficient condition for v(·) to be quasi–concave is that vθθ ≤ 0 in addition to the assumptions in (4).
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Finally, we can eliminate transfers from the seller’s problem. To see this, note that for
any (qˆ, θˆ), transfers can be found such that (32) holds. Hence, we can insert (32) in (31) and
obtain a single constraint that is independent of transfers. Since the objective S(qˆ, θˆ) is also
independent of transfers, the seller’s problem reduces to a maximization problem just over
(qˆ, θˆ). The next proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 4 Let F (·) be convex and v(·) be quasi–concave. Then the seller’s problem is
max
qˆ,θˆ
∫ θ¯
θˆ
[v(qˆ, θ)− c(qˆ)] dF (θ) (33)
subject to
−
F ′(θˆ)
1− F (θˆ)
v(qˆ, θˆ) + c′(qˆ)
vθ(qˆ, θˆ)
vq(qˆ, θˆ)
≤ 0. (34)
In other words, the feasible set of (qˆ, θˆ)–combinations which jointly satisfy the seller’s no–
commitment and the buyer’s incentive communication incentive constraints reduces to the
simple inequality constraint (34).12 This is a rather remarkable simplification of the problem
that we started out with.
Using Proposition 4, it is straightforward to compute the optimal contract. Let, for
example, θ be uniformly distributed on [0, 1], v(q, θ) = qθ, and c(q) = cq2. Then it is easily
verified that qˆ = 0.3492/c and θˆ = 0.5565 solve problem (33)–(34). By (25) and (26) the
optimal contract specifies the trade payment pT = 0.2286/c and the exit payment pN =
0.0343/c.
5 Message Games
In the two benchmark situations considered in Section 3, a simple exit option contract imple-
ments the first–best already. Therefore the seller cannot increase his profit by using a more
complicated mechanism. Yet, as our analysis in the previous section has shown, the first–best
cannot be achieved by such simple contracts when the buyers’ type is private information
and quality is not verifiable. In this section we extend this observation by showing that the
first–best cannot be implemented even under the most general form of contracting.
12The corresponding transfers pN and pT are determined by (25) and (26).
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From a general contracting perspective, exit option contracts are restrictive in two ways.
First, the trade outcome described by (1) is deterministic. If a publicly verifiable randomisa-
tion device is available, a contract can more generally specify a probability of trade. Second,
an exit option contract limits communication to a simple message of the buyer whether he
accepts or refuses trade. Given that both parties are informed about the seller’s quality
choice, trade can more generally be made contingent on the outcome of a message game in
which the parties use their information to exchange verifiable messages.
To remove these restrictions of the exit option contract, we modify stage t = 3 of the
environment described in Section 2. In t = 3, the seller and the buyer now become engaged
in a message game, where they simultaneously select messages zS ∈ ZS and zB ∈ ZB,
respectively. Even though we describe the exchange of messages as a static game, this
description may be thought of as the normal form representation of a dynamic game involving
many stages of communication. The messages selected in t = 3 are verifiable so that the terms
of trade can be contractually specified as a function of the buyer’s message m ∈ M in stage
t = 1 and the outcome z = (zS, zB) ∈ Z ≡ ZS × ZB of the message game in stage t = 3.
Thus, in addition to the message sets (M,Z), a contract in most general form determines a
probability of trade x(m, z) and an expected payment p(m, z) from the buyer to the seller.
More formally, a contract is now a combination (M,Z, x, p), where x:M × Z → [0, 1] and
p:M × Z → R.13 The buyer’s and the seller’s expected payoffs are defined as
U(q,m, z|θ) ≡ x(m, z)v(q, θ)− p(m, z), Π(q,m, z) ≡ p(m, z)− c(q). (35)
It is easy to see that this environment entails the exit option contract as a special case, where
x and p do not depend on the seller’s message and the buyer has only two messages, with
x = 1 for one message and x = 0 for the other.
Our description of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium readily extends to the present context.
The only novelty is that, after m and q have been selected in the previous stages, in t = 3
now a continuation game Γ(m, q) starts in which the seller has imperfect information about
the buyer’s type. After having observed the buyer’s message m, the seller enters Γ(m, q) with
the belief that the buyer’s true type is in the set T ∈ T with probability µ(T,m). The game
Γ(m, q) is thus a (static) Bayesian game, and as part of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
of the overall game, the players’ message strategies have to constitute a Bayesian Nash
13In principle, Z may depend on m ∈ M . In what follows, we ignore this possibility because it does not
affect our results.
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Equilibrium. This means that (zˆS, zˆB(·)), with zˆS ∈ ZS and zˆB: Θ → ZB, is an equilibrium
of Γ(m, q) if the seller’s message zˆS satisfies∫ θ¯
θ
p(m, zˆS, zˆB(θ))µ(θ,m)dθ ≥
∫ θ¯
θ
p(m, zS, zˆB(θ))µ(θ,m)dθ for all zS ∈ ZS, (36)
and each buyer type θ with m ∈ R(θ) selects a message zˆB(θ) such that
U(q,m, zˆS, zˆB(θ)|θ) ≥ U(q,m, zˆS, zB|θ) for all zB ∈ ZB. (37)
Notice that in t = 3 the seller’s production costs are already sunk so that in (36) he only
cares about expected payments when choosing his message zˆS. In what follows we denote by
E(m, q) the set of Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the game Γ(m, q).
As is well–known, message games typically admit a multiplicity of equilibria. While
some of these equilibria may implement the desired outcome, others may induce unintended
outcomes. To resolve this problem, we will apply the usual concept of strong implementation,
which requires that all equilibria in E(m, q) have identical outcomes. More specifically, we
restrict the set of admissible contracts by imposing the following condition on all continuation
games Γ(m, q):
Condition 1 If (zˆS, zˆB(·)) ∈ E(m, q) and (z˜S, z˜B(·)) ∈ E(m, q), then
x(m, zˆS, zˆB(θ)) = x(m, z˜S, z˜B(θ)) and p(m, zˆS, zˆB(θ)) = p(m, z˜S, z˜B(θ)) (38)
for almost all θ such that m ∈ R(θ).
Thus, if the buyer type θ has reported m ∈M in stage t = 1 and the seller has produced
quality q in stage t = 2, Condition 1 implies that the probability of trade x and the payment
p are uniquely determined by the outcome of the subsequent message game in t = 3, even
when this game has multiple equilibria.
After a contract has been signed, the path of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium induces
for each buyer type θ some message m∗(θ) in stage t = 1. Given his equilibrium beliefs
µ∗(·,m∗(θ)), the seller then chooses some quality q∗(θ) in t = 2. Finally, in t = 3 the
equilibrium outcome (z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)) of the message game Γ(m
∗(θ), q∗(θ)) determines a prob-
ability of trade x∗(θ) and a payment p∗(θ). We say that a contract implements (q∗, x∗), with
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q∗ : Θ → R+ and x
∗ : Θ → [0, 1], if there is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium such that, for
each type θ, equilibrium play results in trade of quality q∗(θ) with probability x∗(θ).14
In the remainder of this section, we show that even in the most general contracting envi-
ronment the first–best outcome cannot be implemented as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Indeed, similarly to the exit option contract studied in the previous section, partial pooling of
different buyer types is unavoidable in any equilibrium outcome. We begin with the following
lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that (q∗, x∗) can be implemented. If there is an interval I = [θ1, θ2] ⊆ Θ
such that q∗(·) is strictly increasing on I and x∗(·) = 1 on I, then for each θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) the
buyer’s message m∗(θ) reveals his type to the seller so that µ∗(θ,m∗(θ)) = 1.
To see the intuition behind Lemma 5, observe that since q∗(·) is strictly increasing on I,
the seller chooses distinct quality levels for each type in I. Therefore, each type in I has
to use a distinct message at stage 1. Moreover, the single–crossing property vqθ > 0 implies
that types outside of I have a stronger incentive to imitate a type at the boundary than in
the interior of I. Hence, each buyer type in (θ1, θ2) sends a message that is not used by any
other type and therefore reveals his type to the seller. The next lemma is key to our analysis.
Lemma 6 Suppose that Condition 1 holds and that (q∗, x∗) can be implemented. If there is
an interval I = [θ1, θ2] ⊆ Θ such that q
∗(·) is strictly increasing on I and x∗(·) = 1 on I,
then for each θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) there exists a message z
′
B 6= z
∗
B(θ) such that x(m
∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B) < 1
and
U(q∗(θ),m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)|θ) = U(q
∗(θ),m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B|θ). (39)
Recall from the analysis of exit options that to implement a positive quality level, by (22)
the smallest buyer type who trades this quality level has to be indifferent between trade and
exit. Lemma 6 extends this insight to the general contracting environment. Equation (39)
says that for any buyer type θ in the interior of I there has to be some message z′B such
14In principle, q and x could be lotteries since the buyer could use a mixed strategy in t = 1. Yet we
restrict ourselves to non–random outcomes of q and x as the first–best, for which we want to establish an
impossibility result, is non–random.
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that the buyer is indifferent between trading q∗(θ) with probability 1, and trading q∗(θ) with
probability x(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B) at a lower price. As in the case of exit options, the underlying
reason is the seller’s limited commitment which makes it necessary to deter the seller from
lowering the desired quality ex post.
To see this more clearly, observe that under the assumptions of Lemma 6, a buyer type
θ in the interior of I reveals himself by Lemma 5. Now suppose the seller deviated to a
quality q′ slightly below q∗(θ) in stage 2 and announced his original equilibrium message
z∗S(θ) in stage 3. If there was no message z
′
B that left the buyer indifferent as in (39),
then his best response would still be to announce z∗B(θ) and thus trade q
′ with probability
1 at the same price. In other words, the messages (z∗B(θ), z
∗
S(θ)) would remain to be an
equilibrium of the continuation game that starts after a deviation of the seller to q′. Since q′
is less costly to produce than q∗(θ), the seller would benefit from such a deviation provided
(z∗B(θ), z
∗
S(θ)) would indeed be played in stage 3. Under Condition 1, however, it does not
matter which equilibrium is played since any equilibrium yields the same payment to the
seller. Consequently, the seller could indeed gain from deviating to a lower quality.
In other words, the message z′B serves a similar function as an exit option in restraining the
seller’s limited commitment: it creates a credible threat for the buyer that deters the seller to
lower quality ex post. In the previous sections, we have seen that designing exit options in a
way that would give the seller incentives to choose first–best quality is incompatible with the
buyer possessing private information, because incentives would arise for low valuation buyers
to pretend a high valuation and then exit. The same force undermines efficient contracting
in the general environment. In fact, pooling of different buyer types is unavoidable because
no strictly increasing quality schedule can be implemented:
Proposition 5 Suppose that Condition 1 holds and that (q∗, x∗) can be implemented. Then
there is no interval I ⊆ Θ such that q∗(·) is strictly increasing and x∗(·) = 1 on I. Thus, if
q∗(·) is positive and continuous and x∗(·) = 1 on some interval I, then q∗(·) is constant on
I.
The intuition for Proposition 5 is the same as for the simple exit option contract studied
in the previous sections. To implement a strictly increasing quality schedule and to prevent
high valuation buyers from mimicking low valuation buyers, high valuation buyers have to
get a higher (ex post) utility than low valuation buyers. But Lemma 6 then implies that it
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becomes profitable for a type θ′ < θ, who is sufficiently close to type θ, to mimic type θ in
stage 1 and then announce message z′B in stage 3.
The second part of Proposition 5 says that if for positive equilibrium qualities trade takes
place with probability one, then only quality schedules can be implemented that have the
shape of a step function. An exit option contract is a special case with only a single step. In
the exit option case, the lowest buyer type who just trades a positive quality is indifferent
between trading this quality and refusing to trade. In the general case, more than one positive
quality levels can be potentially implemented. The basic difference between a simple exit
option and a general mechanism is that in the general mechanism the buyer’s off–equilibrium
threat, which deters the seller from deviating to a lower quality, can involve random trade.
In other words, the general mechanism allows for stochastic exit options. In this way, the
buyer’s expected value from ‘exiting’ can to some degree be made responsive to his type,
whereas by (22) the value of a deterministic exit option must be the same for any buyer
type. This mitigates the incentive constraint that low types must not announce a high type
and then simply exit, and so permits a finer sorting of types than when the exit option is
deterministic.
This reasoning also implies that once we rule out random trade the general mechanism
essentially collapses to a simple exit option contract. This is the object of the next proposi-
tion.
Proposition 6 Suppose that Condition 1 holds and that (q∗, x∗) can be implemented. If
trade is deterministic so that x :M × Z → {0, 1}, then the following holds:
(i) At most a single positive quality level can be implemented. That is, there is θˆ and a
qˆ > 0 such that q∗(θ) = qˆ and x∗(θ) = 1 for all θ > θˆ and q∗(θ) = 0 or x∗(θ) = 0 for
all θ < θˆ.
(ii) (q∗, x∗) can be implemented by an exit option contract.
Random mechanisms are perhaps questionable to implement because of legal enforcement
problems.15 Proposition 6 says that in such circumstances no efficiency gains are possible by
using a more complex mechanism than a simple exit option contract. Even though we have
15For this reason, Che and Hausch (1999) rule out such mechanisms in their analysis.
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shown in Section 2 that exit option contracts fail to achieve full efficiency, they are second–
best efficient. Proposition 6 establishes a central role for exit option contracts in overcoming
problems caused by contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information.
Note that the exit option contract described in Propositions 3 and 6 is simpler than
the efficient contracts of the benchmark cases in the sense that the former supports only a
single quality qˆ rather than a schedule of type dependent qualities. Thus, as the contracting
environment becomes more complex, the resulting contractual arrangement actually becomes
simpler. Complex environments may therefore be consistent with the widespread use of
relatively simple contracts in reality.
6 Conclusion
We have studied bilateral contracting in an environment which is characterized by both con-
tractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. We demonstrate that even under the
most general form of contracts, the joint occurrence of these imperfections necessarily up-
sets first–best efficient contracting. Moreover, when random contracts are precluded, general
contracts cannot improve upon simple exit option contracts.
Our inefficiency result suggests that incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
may be useful for studying institutional design, even in the absence of contract renegotiation.
This is so because the allocation of property rights or decision rights may matter for the extent
to which efficiency can be achieved. Imagine, for example, that the non–verifiable action is
more broadly interpreted as some decision that an organization has to take. Suppose further
that the right to take this decision can be conferred to one of its members. This assignment
of authority may be enforced by the ownership of assets and resources that are necessary to
implement a decision. In such an environment, the optimal institutional arrangement can be
determined by comparing the efficiency implications of different allocations of property and
decision rights.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) Let
k ≡
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ
θ
vθ(q˜(x), x) dx dF (θ) > 0, (40)
and define
p∗T (θ) ≡ v(q˜(θ), θ)−
∫ θ
θ
vθ(q˜(x), x) dx+ k, p
∗
N(θ) ≡ k. (41)
We first show that the mechanism (q˜, p∗) satisfies incentive compatibility (9), that is, for all
θ, θ′:
v(q˜(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) ≥ −p
∗
N(θ
′), (42)
v(q˜(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) ≥ v(q˜(θ
′), θ)− p∗T (θ
′). (43)
Inequality (42) is immediate by the definition of p∗. To see (43), let θ′ > θ. By definition of
p∗T , the difference between the left and the right hand side of (43) is
−
∫ θ′
θ
vθ(q˜(x), x) dx− v(q˜(θ
′), θ) + v(q˜(θ′), θ′). (44)
Since q˜(·) is increasing and vqθ > 0, and since θ
′ > θ, we have
−
∫ θ′
θ
vθ(q˜(x), x) dx ≥ −
∫ θ′
θ
vθ(q˜(θ
′), x) dx = −v(q˜(θ′), θ′) + v(q˜(θ′), θ). (45)
Thus, expression (44) is larger than 0, and this proves (43) for θ′ > θ. The argument for
θ′ < θ is analogous.
Next, we verify the participation constraint (10). We note in passing that (41) implies
that h(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Hence, U(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = v(q˜(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ). Thus,∫ θ¯
θ
U(q(θ), p(θ) | θ) dF (θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
[v(q˜(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ)] dF (θ) (46)
=
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ
θ
vθ(q˜(x), x)dx dF (θ)− k = 0, (47)
where the last equality follows from the definition of k.
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To complete the proof of (a), notice that (q˜, p∗) is optimal, because the seller fully extracts
the first–best surplus∫ θ¯
θ
Π(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) dF =
∫ θ¯
θ
[p∗T (θ)− c(q˜(θ))] dF (48)
=
∫ θ¯
θ
[v(q˜(θ), θ)− c(q˜(θ))] dF −
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ
θ
vθ(q˜(x), x)dx dF + k (49)
= S˜ − 0. (50)
Thus, the seller can clearly not do better than this.
(b) It follows from (a) that under any optimal contract (q∗, p∗), the seller must fully extract
the first–best surplus S˜. This implies that q∗(θ) = q˜(θ) for almost all θ ∈ Θ. Since q∗ = q˜
is strictly increasing in θ almost everywhere, incentive compatibility implies by a standard
argument that U(q∗(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) is strictly increasing in θ almost everywhere. Moreover,
full surplus extraction also implies that h(q∗(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = 1 almost everywhere. Therefore,
there is a Θ′ ∈ T with
∫
Θ′
dF = 1 such that U(q∗(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) is strictly increasing on Θ′ and
U(q∗(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = v(q∗(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) ≥ −p
∗
N(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ
′. (51)
We now prove the claim by showing that v(q∗(θ), θ)−p∗T (θ) > −p
∗
N(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ
′ \{θ}.
Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there is a θ ∈ Θ′\{θ} with v(q∗(θ), θ)−p∗T (θ) = −p
∗
N(θ).
Because Θ′ has mass 1 and θ > θ, we can find a θ′ ∈ Θ′ with θ > θ′. Thus, we have
U(q∗(θ′), p∗(θ′) | θ′) < U(q∗(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = v(q∗(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) = −pN(θ). (52)
But this is a contradiction because incentive compatibility requires that U(q∗(θ′), p∗(θ′) | θ′) ≥
−pN(θ) for type θ
′. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) For given θ ∈ Θ, define
p∗T (θ) ≡ v(q˜(θ), θ), p
∗
N(θ) ≡ 0. (53)
We first verify that q˜(·) satisfies the seller’s no–commitment constraint (12). We show that
the seller optimally selects q˜(·) given p∗. It follows from the definition of transfers in (53)
that when the seller chooses q˜(θ), then the buyer is just willing to trade, and the seller’s
profit is Π(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = p∗T (θ)−c(q˜(θ)). Now consider a quality q < q˜(θ). Then the buyer
exits and the seller’s profit is
Π(q, p∗(θ) | θ) = p∗N(θ)− c(q) ≤ 0 ≤ v(q˜(θ), θ)− c(q˜(θ)) = Π(q˜(θ), p
∗(θ) | θ), (54)
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where the second inequality follows from the assumption that the surplus from the first–best
quality is positive. Consider next a quality q > q˜(θ). Then the buyer accepts to trade and
the seller’s profit is
Π(q, p∗(θ) | θ) = p∗T (θ)− c(q) < p
∗
T (θ)− c(q˜(θ)) = Π(q˜(θ), p
∗(θ) | θ), (55)
where the inequality follows because costs are strictly monotone in q. Thus, (54) and (55)
establish that q˜(·) satisfies the no–commitment constraint (12).
Next, we verify the participation constraint (13). We note in passing that (53) implies
that h(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Hence, U(q˜(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = v(q˜(θ), θ) − p∗T (θ) = 0.
Thus, the participation constraint is, in fact, binding.
To complete the proof of (a), notice that (q˜, p∗) is optimal, because the participation
constraint is binding so that the seller fully extracts the first–best surplus S˜.
(b) It follows from (a) that under any optimal contract (q∗, p∗), the seller must fully extract
the first–best surplus S˜. Therefore, it must hold that h(q∗(θ), p∗(θ) | θ) = 1 for almost all
θ ∈ Θ. That is, there is Θ′ ∈ T with
∫
Θ′
dF = 1 and v(q∗(θ), θ) − p∗T (θ) ≥ −p
∗
N(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ′. Now suppose that there is a θ′ ∈ Θ′ such that v(q∗(θ′), θ′) − p∗T (θ
′) > −p∗N(θ
′).
Then, when faced with buyer type θ′, the seller could increase his profit by slightly reducing
q∗(θ′), a contradiction to the no–commitment constraint (12). Thus, we must have that
v(q∗(θ), θ)− p∗T (θ) = −p
∗
N(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ
′, and this completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: By definition of M+(θ) in (17) one has h(q(m), p(m) | θ) = 1 for all
θ ∈ T+(m). Therefore, by (1), v(q(m), θ)−pT (m) ≥ −pN(m) for all θ ∈ T
+(m). By continuity
of v(q, ·) this implies
v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m) ≥ −pN(m). (56)
Now suppose that v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m) > −pN(m). Since vθ(q, θ) > 0, this implies
v(q(m), θ)− pT (m) > −pN(m) for all θ ∈ T
+(m). (57)
But this means that all buyer types who buy quality q(m) after reporting m would also
purchase a quality slightly below q(m). Hence the seller could gain by reducing q(m), a
contradiction to (14). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: We first prove that pN(m) = pN(m
′) if T+(m) 6= ∅ and T+(m′) 6= ∅.
By Lemma 1 there is a θℓ(m) and a θℓ(m
′) such that
U(q(m), p(m) | θℓ(m)) = v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m) = −pN(m), (58)
U(q(m′), p(m′) | θℓ(m
′)) = v(q(m′), θℓ(m
′))− pT (m
′) = −pN(m
′).
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Since m ∈ M+(θ) for all θ ∈ T+(m), one has U(q(m), p(m) | θ) ≥ U(q(m′), p(m′) | θ) for all
θ ∈ T+(m) and U(q(m′), p(m′) | θ) ≥ U(q(m), p(m) | θ) for all θ ∈ T+(m′). By continuity of
U(q, p | ·) this implies
U(q(m), p(m) | θℓ(m)) ≥ U(q(m
′), p(m′) | θℓ(m)), (59)
U(q(m′), p(m′) | θℓ(m
′)) ≥ U(q(m), p(m) | θℓ(m
′)).
Further, by (2)
U(q(m′), p(m′) | θℓ(m)) ≥ −pN(m
′), U(q(m), p(m) | θℓ(m
′)) ≥ −pN(m). (60)
By (58)–(60), we have −pN(m) ≥ −pN(m
′) and −pN(m
′) ≥ −pN(m). Therefore pN(m) =
pN(m
′).
It remains to show that θℓ(m) = θℓ(m
′) if T+(m) 6= ∅ and T+(m′) 6= ∅. Suppose the
contrary, i.e. θℓ(m) 6= θℓ(m
′). Without loss of generality, let θℓ(m) < θℓ(m
′). Note that
q(m) > 0 and q(m′) > 0 because m ∈ M+(θ) for all θ ∈ T+(m) and m′ ∈ M+(θ) for all
θ ∈ T+(m′). Since each type reports optimally, it must be the case that
v(q(m′), θ)− pT (m
′) ≥ v(q(m), θ)− pT (m) for all θ ∈ T
+(m′), (61)
so that, by continuity of v(q, ·),
v(q(m′), θℓ(m
′))− pT (m
′) ≥ v(q(m), θℓ(m
′))− pT (m). (62)
Since θℓ(m) < θℓ(m
′) and vθ(q, θ) > 0,
v(q(m), θℓ(m
′))− pT (m) > v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m). (63)
By (62) and (63),
v(q(m′), θℓ(m
′))− pT (m
′) > v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m). (64)
Because pN(m) = pN(m
′) this yields a contradiction to Lemma 1, which implies that
v(q(m′), θℓ(m
′))− pT (m
′) = −pN(m
′) = −pN(m) = v(q(m), θℓ(m))− pT (m). (65)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) We first show that θ > θˆ implies R(θ) ⊆M+(θ), i.e. all types
θ > θˆ only select positive trade messages. If T+(m) = ∅ for all m ∈ M , then θˆ = θ¯, and the
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claim trivially holds. So suppose there is an m ∈ M such that T+(m) 6= ∅. Contrary to the
claim, suppose there is a θ > θˆ and an m′ ∈M(θ) \M+(θ). Since reporting m′ is optimal for
type θ, we have:
U(q(m′), p(m′) | θ) = max[−pT (m
′),−pN(m
′)] (66)
≥ v(q(m), θ)− pT (m)
> v(q(m), θˆ)− pT (m)
The first line follows since q(m′)h(q(m′), p(m′)|θ) = 0 and v(0, θ) = 0, the second line follows
since m′ is optimal for type θ, and the third line follows since θ > θˆ and vθ(q, θ) > 0. By
definition of θˆ, we have m ∈M(θˆ), i.e. reporting m is optimal for type θˆ. By (22) this implies
U(q(m), p(m) | θˆ) = v(q(m), θˆ)− pT (m) ≥ U(q(m
′), p(m′) | θˆ) (67)
= max[v(q(m′), θˆ)− pT (m
′),−pN(m
′)]
≥ max[−pT (m
′),−pN(m
′)]
Thus, v(q(m), θˆ) − pT (m) ≥ max[−pT (m
′),−pN(m
′)], which yields a contradiction to (66).
This proves that θ > θˆ implies R(θ) ⊆M+(θ).
To complete the proof of (i), it remains to show that there is a qˆ such that q(m) = qˆ
for all m ∈ R(θ) with θ > θˆ. Suppose the contrary. Then there is a θ > θˆ and a θ′ > θˆ
such that m ∈ R(θ) and m′ ∈ R(θ′) with q(m) < q(m′). Since we have shown above that
R(θ) ⊆ M+(θ) and R(θ′) ⊆ M+(θ′), we know that T+(m) 6= ∅ and T+(m′) 6= ∅. Hence, by
(22)
v(q(m), θˆ)− pT (m) = v(q(m
′), θˆ)− pT (m
′). (68)
Therefore, q(m′) > q(m), θ > θˆ, and vqθ(q, θ) > 0 implies
v(q(m′), θ)− v(q(m), θ) > v(q(m′), θˆ)− v(q(m), θˆ) = pT (m
′)− pT (m). (69)
But this is a contradiction because v(q(m), θ)− pT (m) ≥ v(q(m
′), θ)− pT (m
′) as m ∈ R(θ).
(ii) Let θ < θˆ and suppose to the contrary that there is an m ∈ R(θ) such that q(m) > 0
and h(q(m), p(m)|θ) = 1. This implies
v(q(m), θ)− pT (m) ≥ −pN(m). (70)
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Since m ∈ R+(θ), it follows by definition that T+(m) 6= ∅. Hence (22) holds for m and
pN(m) = pˆN . However, since θ < θˆ and vθ(q, θ) > 0, (70) and (22) contradict each other.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: For arbitrary (q′, θ′) with v(q′, θ′)− pT = −pN , define
φ(q′, θ′; θˆ) =
∫ θ¯
θˆ
Π(q′, t | θ)
1− F (θˆ)
dF (θ). (71)
With the definition of Π in (3) we have
φ(q′, θ′; θˆ) =
{
pT − c(q
′) if v(q′, θˆ)− pT > −pN ,
F (θ′)−F (θˆ)
1−F (θˆ)
pN +
1−F (θ′)
1−F (θˆ)
pT − c(q
′) if v(q′, θˆ)− pT ≤ −pN .
(72)
Hence, φ is strictly decreasing in q′ if v(q′, θˆ) > pT − pN , or equivalently if θ
′ < θˆ. Therefore,
any maximizer (q, θ) of φ(q′, θ′; θˆ) satisfies v(q, θ) − pT = −pN and θ ≥ θˆ, which are the
constraints in (29). Hence, since the bottom line on the right hand side in (72) coincides
with the objective in (28):
(q, θ) ∈ argmax
(q′,θ′)
φ(q′, θ′; θˆ) ⇔ (q, θ) = (q∗(θˆ, p), θ∗(θˆ, p)). (73)
Consequently: (qˆ, θˆ) satisfies (24) and (25) ⇔ (qˆ, θˆ) ∈ argmax(q′,θ′) φ(q
′, θ′; θˆ) ⇔ (qˆ, θˆ) =
(q∗(θˆ, p), θ∗(θˆ, p)) ⇔ (qˆ, θˆ) satisfies (30). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: For given θˆ, and for all (q′, θ′) denote the objective in (28) by
ψ(q′, θ′; θˆ) =
F (θ′)− F (θˆ)
1− F (θˆ)
pN +
1− F (θ′)
1− F (θˆ)
pT − c(q
′). (74)
Below, we show that under convexity of F , ψ is concave in (q′, θ′) for all θ. Moreover, since
pT > pN , it is evident that ψ is decreasing in q
′ and θ′. Further, since v is quasi–concave
by assumption, the constraint v(q′, θ′) = pT − pN describes a convex curve in (q, θ)-space.
These three observations imply that the necessary first–order conditions for problem (28) are
already sufficient to deliver a maximum. That is, (qˆ, θˆ) = (q∗(θˆ, p), θ∗(θˆ, p)) if and only if the
following Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold:
ψq′(qˆ, θˆ; θˆ)− λvq(qˆ, θˆ) = 0, (75)
ψθ′(qˆ, θˆ; θˆ)− λvθ(qˆ, θˆ) ≤ 0, (76)
v(qˆ, θˆ) = pT − pN , (77)
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for some λ ∈ R. It is easy to see that these conditions are equivalent to (31) and (32). This
establishes the equivalence between (30) on the one and (31) and (32) on the other hand.
It remains to show that ψ is concave in (q′, θ′). Observe first that the cross-partials ψq′θ′
are zero. Thus, ψ is concave if and only if ψq′q′ and ψθ′θ′ are each negative. We have:
ψq′q′(q
′, θ′; θ) = −c′′(q′) and ψθ′θ′(q
′, θ′; θ) = −
F ′′(θ′)
1− F (θ)
(pT − pN). (78)
Since c′′ > 0 by assumption, the left expression is negative. Further, since pT − pN > 0, a
sufficient condition for the right expression to be negative is that F ′′ ≥ 0, and this completes
the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Insert pT − pN from (32) in (31), and observe that the seller’s
problem becomes thus independent of transfers. This yields the claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider a type θ′ ∈ (θ1, θ2) and suppose he chooses message m
∗(θ′) in
equilibrium. We show that type θ′ is the only type who chooses message m∗(θ′), implying full
revelation of this type. Indeed, since q∗(·) is strictly increasing on I = [θ1, θ2] by assumption,
the seller chooses for each θ ∈ I, θ 6= θ′, a distinct quality q∗(θ) 6= q∗(θ′). This can only be
if each buyer type θ ∈ I, θ 6= θ′, chooses a message which is different from m∗(θ′). To see
that a type θ < θ1 does not choose message m
∗(θ′), note that since x∗(·) = 1 on I, the type
θ1 prefers quality q
∗(θ1) over the quality q
∗(θ′). Thus, the single–crossing property vqθ > 0
implies that θ < θ1 strictly prefers q
∗(θ1) over q
∗(θ′). Hence, such a type does not choose the
message m∗(θ′) which would induce quality q∗(θ′). An identical argument shows that also a
type θ > θ2 does not choose the message m
∗(θ′). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let θ ∈ (θ1, θ2), and consider an equilibrium path (m
∗, q∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) =
(m∗(θ), q∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)). Since q
∗(·) is strictly increasing on I we have that q∗ > 0. We
have to show that there is a message z′B ∈ ZB with x(m
∗, z∗S, s
′
B) < 1 such that (39) holds.
To see this, let (zˆS, zˆB(·)) be the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the continuation
game Γ(m∗, q∗) whose outcome is zˆS = z
∗
S, zˆB(θ) = z
∗
B. Since the seller knows the buyer’s
type by Lemma 5, the equilibrium conditions write:
p(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) ≥ p(m
∗, z′S, z
∗
B) for all z
′
S ∈ ZS, (79)
x(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B)v(q
∗, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) ≥ x(m
∗, z∗S, z
′
B)v(q
∗, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, z
′
B) (80)
for all z′B ∈ ZB. We next show that there is a message z
′
B ∈ ZB such that x(m
∗, z∗S, z
′
B) < 1.
If the contrary were true, the buyer’s equilibrium message in Γ(m∗, q∗) would satisfy:
z∗B ∈ argmax
zB
v(q∗, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, zB) (81)
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= argmax
zB
−p(m∗, z∗S, zB). (82)
(79) and (82) imply that (zˆS, zˆB(·)) is also a BNE of the continuation game Γ(m
∗, 0) that
starts after the seller has chosen the quality q = 0. Hence, Condition 1 implies that for all
BNE (z˜S, z˜B(·)) ∈ E(m
∗, 0) it holds that
p(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) = p(m
∗, z˜S, z˜B(θ)). (83)
Thus, the seller gets the same payment in Γ(m∗, 0) as he gets in Γ(m∗, q∗). Since the quality
zero is less costly than q∗ > 0, the seller would therefore be better off by choosing zero quality
at stage 2, but this contradicts the condition that in equilibrium q∗ maximizes the seller’s
profit.
Accordingly, the set of messages z′B for which x(m
∗, z∗S, z
′
B) < 1 is non–empty. Denote
this set by Z ′B. We now show that there is a z
′
B ∈ Z
′
B such that (39) holds. Suppose to the
contrary that for all z′B ∈ Z
′
B the equality (39) does not hold. By (80), this implies that for
all z′B ∈ Z
′
B
x(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B)v(q
∗, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) > x(m
∗, z∗S, z
′
B)v(q
∗, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, z
′
B). (84)
This inequality is also true for a quality q′ slightly below q∗ so that for all z′B ∈ Z
′
B
x(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B)v(q
′, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) > x(m
∗, z∗S, z
′
B)v(q
′, θ)− p(m∗, z∗S, z
′
B). (85)
Now, (79) and (85) imply that (zˆS, zˆB(·)) is also a BNE of the continuation game Γ(m
∗, q′).
Hence, Condition 1 implies that for all (z˜S, z˜B(·)) ∈ E(m
∗, q′) it holds that
p(m∗, z∗S, z
∗
B) = p(m
∗, z˜S, z˜B(θ)). (86)
Thus, the seller gets the same payment in Γ(m∗, q′) as he gets in Γ(m∗, q∗). Since the quality
q′ is less costly than q∗, this contradicts the condition that in equilibrium q∗ maximizes the
seller’s profit. This establishes Lemma 6 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider an arbitrary interval I with x∗(·) = 1 on I. For each
θ ∈ I, let an equilibrium path be denoted by (m∗(θ), q∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)). We have to show
that q∗(·) is not strictly increasing on I. We begin with an auxiliary observation:
q∗(·) is (weakly) increasing on I. Therefore it is continuous a.e. on I. (87)
Since x∗(·) = 1 on I, (87) follows from an incentive compatibility argument which is standard
and therefore omitted. The rest of the proof is by contradiction. Suppose that q∗(·) is strictly
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increasing on I. By (87), we can choose a θ ∈ I so that q∗(·) is continuous at θ. By Lemma
6, there is a message z′B with x ≡ x(m
∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B) < 1 such that
v(q∗(θ), θ)− p(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)) = x · v(q
∗(θ), θ)− p(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B), (88)
where on the left hand side we have used that x(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)) = x
∗(θ) = 1. Let
ε = (1− x)vθ(q
∗(θ), θ). (89)
vθ(q, θ) is continuous in q, and since Θ is compact, vθ(q, ·) is uniformly continuous on Θ.
Hence, there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that for all q
′, τ, τ ′ with |q∗(θ) − q′| < δ1 and |τ − τ
′| < δ2,
we have:
|vθ(q
∗(θ), τ)− vθ(q
′, τ ′)| < ε. (90)
Since q∗(·) is continuous at θ, we can find a θ′ ∈ I, θ′ < θ such that q∗(θ′) > 0 and
|q∗(θ)− q∗(θ′)| < δ1 and |θ − θ
′| < δ2. (91)
With these preparations, we will now derive a contradiction. In equilibrium, type θ′ does
not gain by deviating to message m∗(θ) in period 1 and message z′B in period 3. Since
x(m∗(θ′), z∗S(θ
′), z∗B(θ
′)) = x∗(θ′) = 1, we therefore have:
v(q∗(θ′), θ′)− p(m∗(θ′), z∗S(θ
′), z∗B(θ
′)) ≥ x · v(q∗(θ), θ′)− p(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B). (92)
Further, type θ does not gain by imitating the equilibrium strategy of type θ′. Thus,
v(q∗(θ), θ)− p(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
∗
B(θ)) ≥ v(q
∗(θ′), θ)− p(m∗(θ′), z∗S(θ
′), z∗B(θ
′)). (93)
Combining (88) and (93) gives:
x · v(q∗(θ), θ)− p(m∗(θ), z∗S(θ), z
′
B) ≥ v(q
∗(θ′), θ)− p(m∗(θ′), z∗S(θ
′), z∗B(θ
′)). (94)
By (92) and (94), we have:
v(q∗(θ′), θ)− v(q∗(θ′), θ′) ≤ x · [v(q∗(θ), θ)− v(q∗(θ), θ′)]. (95)
By the mean value theorem, there are τ, τ ′ ∈ [θ′, θ] such that the previous inequality writes
vθ(q
∗(θ′), τ ′)(θ − θ′) ≤ x · vθ(q
∗(θ), τ)(θ − θ′). (96)
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Thus, since θ − θ′ > 0 and vθ(q
∗(θ), τ) > 0, we obtain:
x ≥
vθ(q
∗(θ′), τ ′)− vθ(q
∗(θ), τ)
vθ(q∗(θ), τ)
+ 1 (97)
>
−ε
vθ(q∗(θ), τ)
+ 1 (98)
≥
−ε
vθ(q∗(θ), θ)
+ 1 (99)
= x, (100)
where the second inequality follows from (90) and (91), the third inequality follows because
τ ≤ θ implies that vθ(q
∗(θ), τ) ≤ vθ(q
∗(θ), θ), and the final inequality follows from (89). Thus,
we have arrived at a contradiction, and this proves the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 (i) Consider qualities 0 < q∗1 < q
∗
2 and define the sets
Θi = {θ ∈ Θ | q
∗(θ) = q∗i ∧ x
∗(θ) = 1}, i = 1, 2. (101)
We first proof the following:
Θ2 6= ∅ ⇒ Θ1 has measure zero. (102)
Suppose to the contrary that Θ2 6= ∅ and Θ1 has positive measure. Let (zˆS(m
∗(θ)),
zˆB(m
∗(θ), ·)) be a BNE of the game Γ(m∗(θ), q∗(θ)). Note that for all θ ∈ Θi, the equi-
librium payments have to be the same: p(m∗(θ), zˆS(m
∗(θ)), zˆB(m
∗(θ), θ)) = p∗i . For if there
were two types in Θi with different equilibrium payments, then since the chosen quality is
constant on Θi, the type with the higher payment could gain by sending the messages m and
zB of the type with the lower payment. Therefore, since no type in Θi has an incentive to
mimic the equilibrium strategy of a type in Θj, we have for all θi ∈ Θi:
v(q∗i , θi)− p
∗
i ≥ v(q
∗
j , θi)− p
∗
j . (103)
Next, since Θ1 has positive measure, Θ1 contains at least two types θ
′
1 < θ
′′
1 . Let m1 =
m∗(θ′1) with q(m1) = q
∗
1 be the message used by the type θ
′
1. Moreover, let m2 be some
message with q(m2) = q
∗
2 and m2 = m
∗(θ2) for some θ2 ∈ Θ2. Further, define by θℓi =
inf{θ ∈ Θi | m
∗(θ) = mi} the lowest type in Θi who uses the message mi. We make use of
the following claims.
Claim 1 : There is a ziB ∈ ZB such that v(q
∗
i , θℓi)− p
∗
i = −p(mi, zˆS(mi), z
i
B).
Claim 2 : p(m1, zˆS(m1), z
1
B) = p(m2, zˆS(m2), z
2
B).
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Claims 1 and 2 follow from arguments which are similar to the arguments used in the
proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 6. We omit the details. Claims 1 and 2 imply that
v(q∗1, θℓ1)− p
∗
1 = v(q
∗
2, θℓ2)− p
∗
2. (104)
Now, by continuity of v(q, ·), the inequality (103) carries over to the types θℓi:
v(q∗1, θℓ1)− p
∗
1 ≥ v(q
∗
2, θℓ1)− p
∗
2, v(q
∗
2, θℓ2)− p
∗
2 ≥ v(q
∗
1, θℓ2)− p
∗
1. (105)
Hence, (104) implies that v(q∗2, θℓ2) ≥ v(q
∗
2, θℓ1) and v(q
∗
1, θℓ1) ≥ v(q
∗
1, θℓ2). Consequently:
θℓ1 = θℓ2. Thus, since q
∗
1 < q
∗
2, (104) together with vqθ > 0 implies that for the type
θ′′1 > θ
′
1 ≥ θℓ1, we have
v(q∗2, θ
′′
1)− v(q
∗
1, θ
′′
1) > p
∗
2 − p
∗
1, (106)
a contradiction to (103). This establishes (102).
We can now demonstrate (i). If q∗(·) = 0 almost everywhere on Θ, the claim is true for
θˆ = θ¯. So suppose there is a positive measure set Θ′ ⊆ Θ with q∗(·) > 0 and x∗(·) = 1 on
Θ′. By incentive compatibility q∗(·) is increasing on Θ′. It is well–known that this implies
that q∗(·) is continuous almost everywhere on Θ′. Thus, Proposition 5 entails that q∗(·) is
piece–wise constant on Θ′. Therefore, it follows from (102) that q∗(·) is in fact constant on
Θ′ except possibly at θˆ = inf Θ′, and this implies (i).
(ii) Let (q∗, x∗) have the form described under (i). Let the exit option contract be given as
follows: M = {mℓ,mh}, ZB = {T,N} and ZS = ∅, and define x(m,N) = 0 and x(m,T ) = 1
for all m. Moreover, let p(mℓ, N) = p(mℓ, T ) = 0 and p(mh, N) = 0 and p(mℓ, T ) = v(qˆ, θˆ).
It is easy to verify that (M,Z, x, p) implements (q∗, x∗). Q.E.D.
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